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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you manage an Australian pharmaceutical company. 
Because your patent permitting the sale of diabetes medication in Australia 
will expire in one year, you look to sell your product in Japan. Unfamiliar 
with the Japanese market, you enter into a co-promotion agreement with 
Beta, a Belgian pharmaceutical company with extensive experience in Japan. 
Wary of litigating in a foreign, civil law jurisdiction, your counsel 
recommends that you include an arbitration clause in your co-promotion 
agreement, which you adopt.  
Six months after the conclusion of the agreement, you suspect that Beta 
has not lived up to its promotional obligations, as Japanese doctors are not 
prescribing your medication. Pursuant to the agreement, you commence 
arbitration in London. Fortunately, the arbitration produces an award 
requiring Beta to pay you hundreds of millions of dollars. Seeking the 
money you are due under the award, you bring an action to enforce the 
award before a Belgian court. To your surprise, the Belgian court, rather 
than summarily enforcing the award, agrees to hear a counterclaim that Beta 
raises against you. This counterclaim protracts the litigation, and by the 
time you defeat the counterclaim and prevail in the action, Beta has 
transferred its assets out of Belgium. 
After an exhaustive search, you find enough of Beta’s assets in the 
United States to satisfy the award against Beta. Moreover, your counsel 
indicates that American courts will refuse to hear any counterclaims that 
Beta might raise in any enforcement proceedings. You therefore bring an 
enforcement action in U.S. federal court. To your dismay, the court 
dismisses your claim as time-barred by the Federal Arbitration Act’s three-
year statute of limitations. Your foray into international commerce 
decisively stymied, you resign yourself to developing a new drug to 
distribute in Australia. 
The difficulties faced by the fictional Australian pharmaceutical 
company above mirror the obstacles that real parties encounter when trying 
to enforce rights secured through international arbitration. These 
difficulties stem from the fact that countries have enacted different barriers 
to the enforcement of international arbitral awards.1 These cross-national 
 
1 See Teresa Cheng, Celebrating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the New York Convention (noting that 
attempts to enforce the same award in different jurisdictions have produced inconsistent 
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differences in barriers persist today, despite the fact that the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards of 1958 (“New York Convention” or “Convention”) attempted to 
eliminate such differences.2 Through the New York Convention, the 
international community sought to limit and standardize the grounds on 
which countries could refuse to enforce arbitral awards.3 
The lack of international uniformity does not arise because countries 
that have ratified the New York Convention are intentionally violating the 
treaty; rather, the problem lies within the treaty itself—the New York 
Convention contains a choice of law problem. It establishes that two sets of 
laws will govern actions to enforce international arbitration awards: its own 
provisions and the national laws of state-parties.4 National courts have 
adopted traditional choice of law methods in order to choose whether they 
will use their own national laws or the treaty provisions to decide a 
particular issue. However, this divergence has brought to enforcement 
actions the same two problems it has brought to other more conventional 
civil litigations—absurd and nonuniform outcomes. The lack of uniformity 
is particularly vexing, as the New York Convention’s very purpose was to 
ensure the uniform treatment of a given arbitration award across countries.  
This Comment proposes that just as courts have abandoned the 
traditional choice of law approach in conventional litigation, they should 
also abandon it in arbitral enforcement litigation. Courts should instead use 
modern choice of law doctrine. Employing modern choice of law doctrine to 
enforcement actions would produce sensible results and bring uniformity to 
the enforcement of international arbitral awards. This Comment focuses on 
the United States and the Federal Arbitration Act as a case study.5 It 
suggests that applying modern American choice of law doctrine to the 
Federal Arbitration Act, mainly by limiting the application of the statute of 
limitations contained in section 207 of the Act, would help the United 
States better implement the New York Convention. 
Part I of this Comment sets out the background, purpose, and provisions 
of the New York Convention. Part II uncovers the choice of law problem 
embedded in the treaty, and in the Federal Arbitration Act that implements 
 
outcomes), in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 679, 683 (Albert Jan van den Berg 
ed., 2009). 
2 June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; see also Cheng, supra note 1, at 679 (“It is trite 
and well recognized that the grounds upon which parties can rely to resist enforcement have been 
exhaustively listed in Art. V [of the New York Convention].”). 
3 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V.  
4 Id., art. III. 
5 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2012) (implementing the New York Convention). 
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the treaty in the United States. Part III describes the traditional choice of 
law approach and demonstrates that the adoption of this approach in 
implementing the New York Convention has brought about absurd and 
nonuniform consequences. Part IV suggests moving to a modern choice of 
law approach. Focusing on the United States and the Federal Arbitration 
Act, it offers three variants of modern American choice of law doctrine: 
interest analysis, Erie analysis, and Reverse-Erie analysis. These variants all 
call for either restricting the scope of the statute of limitations found in the 
Federal Arbitration Act, or subordinating it in favor of the statute of 
limitations found in the New York Convention itself. The use of a modern 
choice of law approach would allow the United States in particular, and state-
parties in general, to effectuate the purpose of the Convention, and restore 
uniformity to the enforcement of international arbitral awards worldwide. 
I.  BACKGROUND, PURPOSE, AND PROVISIONS OF THE NEW YORK 
CONVENTION 
A successor to the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards,6 the New York Convention has been described as “the most 
effective instance of international legislation in the entire history of 
commercial law.”7 The treaty’s success is further substantiated by the 
representative worldwide participation in it: 149 nations have ratified it,8 
including “all parts of the world [with] many different levels of commerce 
and development[, and a]lmost all the major international trading nations.”9 
This near-universal participation is made all the more remarkable when one 
considers that the Convention undertakes the controversial endeavor of 
limiting countries’ judicial sovereignty. For example, no treaty regarding 
the enforcement of foreign court judgments has achieved comparable 
 
6 Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302. For a discussion of the problems in this predecessor treaty, 
see Robert Briner and Virginia Hamilton, The History and General Purpose of the Convention: The 
Creation of an International Standard to Ensure the Effectiveness of Arbitration Agreements and Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE 3, 6-11 (Emmanuel 
Gaillard & Domenico di Pietro eds., 2008). 
7 Michael John Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 43, 49 (1989). 
8 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails. aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no= 
XXII-1&chapter=22&lang=en [http://perma.cc/YUQ2-94YG] (last updated Oct. 6, 2015) (listing 
the countries that have signed or ratified the New York Convention). 
9 Joseph T. McLaughlin & Laurie Genevro, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under the New 
York Convention—Practice in U.S. Courts, 3 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 249, 251 (1986). 
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participation.10 Yet, the vast majority of states have decided to sacrifice some 
degree of judicial sovereignty in the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
States sacrifice such sovereignty in return for the economic and 
reputational benefits conferred by accession to the New York Convention. A 
state that joins the treaty signals to the international business community 
that it is a hospitable forum where businesses may resolve their disputes,11 
particularly since the Convention allows state-parties to limit their 
enforcement of awards only to those awards made in the territory of other 
state-parties.12 Even putative states accede to the Convention,13 suggesting 
that membership in the treaty legitimizes a state’s claim to a place not just 
in the international business community, but also in the community of 
states more broadly.  
The Convention’s purpose is to bring uniformity and efficiency to the 
enforcement of international arbitration awards.14 For example, the U.S. 
 
10 See Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 
(mandating that state parties enforce in their courts judgments given by courts of other state 
parties in cases arising out of contracts with an exclusive choice of court agreement). This treaty 
has been ratified only by Mexico and members of the European Union (except for Denmark), and 
signed by the United States and Singapore. Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of 
Court Agreements, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIV. INT’L L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en. 
php?act=conventions.status2&cid=98 [http://perma.cc/BZ4A-PA6Z] (last updated June 19, 2015) 
(listing the countries that have signed or ratified the Hague Convention). 
11 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. III (mandating that state-parties enforce 
arbitral awards brought before their courts); Gerold Herrmann, The 1958 New York Convention: Its 
Objectives and Its Future (stating that the availability of dispute resolution has proven to be “the 
single most convincing reason for adherence” to the Convention in the author’s conversations with 
representatives of non-signatory states), in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 15, 18 
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1999). The influence of the Convention does not stop with accession, 
as states that have acceded typically modify the rest of their national arbitration legislation to 
conform to the pro-arbitration framework established by the Convention. Briner & Hamilton, 
supra note 6, at 20. 
12 New York Convention, supra note 2, art. I. Nearly two-thirds of state-parties have availed 
themselves of this right, known as the “reciprocity reservation.” GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.02[G] (2012). 
13 See, e.g., Alison Ross, Palestine Accedes to the New York Convention, GLOBAL ARB. REV. 
(Jan. 7, 2015), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/33283/palestine-accedes-new-york-
convention/ [http://perma.cc/ANZ4-EXKJ] (noting that Palestine, which is “not universally 
recognised as a sovereign state,” acceded to the New York Convention). 
14 See Rory Brady, Comments on a New York Convention for the Next Fifty Years (assuming that 
the New York Convention’s “twin goals of efficiency and uniformity in the enforcement of 
international arbitration awards are probably shared by everybody”), in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW 
YORK CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 708, 708; see also Albert Jan van den Berg, Striving for 
Uniform Interpretation (noting that at the time the Convention was concluded, delegates believed 
that the text and structure ensured uniformity), in ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS 
UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS 41, 41 (United 
Nations 1999). 
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Supreme Court has stated that the Convention seeks to “encourage the 
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in 
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to 
arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory 
countries.”15 The Convention looks to national courts to achieve its purpose. 
It “mobilises national courts as enforcement agencies while simultaneously 
restricting their scope of national judicial supervision over international 
arbitration awards.”16  
There are three key provisions that collectively achieve this simultaneous 
“mobilization and restriction,” or in other words, that simultaneously create 
and limit the authority of national courts to enforce awards. 
First, Article III mobilizes (creates authority for) national courts to 
enforce international arbitration awards by requiring them to enforce such 
awards: “Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding 
and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory 
where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the 
following articles.”17 The next two articles then restrict national courts’ 
scope of “supervision over international arbitration awards” by respectively 
limiting the evidence and substantive defenses national courts may consider 
in enforcement proceedings.18 Article IV sets out the evidentiary 
requirements of enforcement proceedings. The requirements are minimal: a 
party seeking enforcement need only provide (a) the authenticated original 
or certified copy of the award, and (b) the original arbitration agreement 
pursuant to which the award was made.19 
Article V then lays out the seven exhaustive defenses that permit, but do 
not require, a court to refuse to enforce an award:  
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request 
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the 
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, 
proof that:  
(a) [The arbitration agreement was invalid due to incapacity of the 
parties or otherwise under the law governing the arbitration agreement]; or 
(b) [The award debtor lacked notice or an opportunity to be heard]; or 
 
15 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1973). 
16 Michael Reisman, Preface to ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, supra note 6, at 1, 1. This combination has been described 
as the “genius” of the Convention. Id. 
17 New York Convention, supra note 2, art. III (emphasis added). 
18 Reisman, supra note 16, at 1. 
19 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. IV. 
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(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling 
within the terms of the submission to arbitration . . . ; or 
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure 
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties [or of the law of the 
country where the arbitration took place]; or 
  (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been 
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or 
under the law of which, that award was made. 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement 
is sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is [non-arbitrable]; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to 
the public policy of that country.20 
These provisions achieve efficiency by limiting the evidence and issues 
that courts may consider, thereby turning enforcement actions into 
summary proceedings.21 They achieve uniformity by standardizing the 
grounds on which national courts may refuse to recognize awards. Indeed, 
the international community standardized the grounds for nonenforcement 
in Article V because it thought that standardized international rules are 
preferable to the various grounds for refusal that were found in signatories’ 
domestic laws prior to the creation of the Convention, since “mechanical 
application of domestic arbitral law to foreign awards . . . would seriously 
undermine finality and regularly produce conflicting judgments.”22 
 
20 Id. art. V (emphasis added). 
21 See Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Confirmation under the [New 
York] Convention is a summary proceeding in nature, which is not intended to involve complex 
factual determinations, other than a determination of the limited statutory conditions for 
confirmation or grounds for refusal to confirm.”); Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 
1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The purpose of arbitration is to permit a relatively quick and 
inexpensive resolution of contractual disputes by avoiding the expense and delay of extended court 
proceedings. Accordingly, it is a well-settled proposition that judicial review of an arbitration 
award should be, and is, very narrowly limited.” (internal citations omitted)); Evergreen Sys., Inc. 
v. Geotech Lizenz AG, 697 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (“[T]he [New York] Convention 
envisions a summary disposition of the issues where the relief sought is to be denied only if the 
party resisting enforcement shows that one of the specific grounds stated in the Convention for 
non-enforcement exists.”). 
22 Baker Marine (Nig.) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194, 197 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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II.  THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
ACT EACH CONTAIN WITHIN THEM A CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEM 
Choice of law problems arise when different laws attach different 
consequences to the same set of facts.23 The different laws need not come 
from different sovereigns, as a choice of law involves just that—a clash of 
legal rules, not legal systems.24 A court confronting a choice of law problem 
has a two-step process for resolving it.25 First, the court must decide 
whether all of the different laws do in fact attach consequences—that is, 
establish rights or obligations—to the facts. Second, if more than one law 
attaches consequences, the court must decide which should prevail. 
The New York Convention presents such a choice of law problem. 
Article III provides that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral 
awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of 
the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in 
the following articles.”26 
Thus, this provision establishes that two sets of laws will govern actions 
in national courts to enforce arbitral awards: (1) the rules of procedure of 
the national courts, and (2) the “conditions laid down in the following 
articles,” referring to Articles IV and V of the Convention itself, 
respectively establishing evidentiary requirements and grounds for refusal.27  
 
23 See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 2448, 2465 (1999) (defining a conflict of laws as a situation involving “rights created by 
different laws,” such as when the plaintiff asserts a right derived from one law, and the defendant 
counters with a right (or privilege against liability) derived from another). 
24 Larry Kramer, More Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 24 CORNELL 
INT’L. L.J. 245, 252 (1991); see also id. at 250-52 (presenting a hypothetical conflict between two 
“vehicular collision” statutes from the same jurisdiction as potentially applicable to a passenger 
struck by a vehicle on an on-ramp); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
277, 283 (1990) (“[T]he assumption that choice of law problems arise only in multistate cases is 
erroneous.”). 
25 See KERMIT ROOSEVELT, III, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (2d ed. 2010) (describing the two 
steps as, first, establishing the scope of the various applicable laws, and, second, devising a rule of 
priority to choose one law over the others); Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 24, at 285 
(noting that “[c]hoosing between [two] laws requires a two-step process,” first, interpreting each 
law in isolation, and then choosing between them in the event that both give the plaintiff a right to 
recover); Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 982 (1991) (“This approach 
[to resolving choice of law disputes] consists of two steps: a first step to determine whether there 
is a conflict, and a second step to resolve conflicts on the basis of ‘policy-selecting rules.’”). 
26 New York Convention, supra note 2, art. III (emphasis added). 
27 Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview (“[A] clear 
distinction is made between the conditions for enforcement in respect of which the Convention 
alone is controlling and the procedure for enforcement in respect of which the procedural law of 
the forum governs.”), in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, supra note 6, at 39, 54; Emilia Onyema, Formalities of the 
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These two sets of laws may conflict. In other words, they may attach 
different consequences to the same enforcement action. More specifically, a 
national procedural rule may require a court to dismiss a claim for 
enforcement, while Article V, which calls for enforcement in the absence of 
any enumerated ground for refusal, may require the award to be enforced. 
This situation commonly arises with national statutes of limitations that bar 
enforcement actions. For example, the Federal Arbitration Act is the 
implementing legislation28 for the Convention in the United States.29 Section 
207 of the Act provides a statute of limitations of three years for enforcement 
actions.30 However, Article V of the Convention omits any limitations period 
from its exhaustive list of grounds for refusal of enforcement; this omission 
may be recast as establishing an indefinite time period in which enforcement 
may be sought.31 Thus, if a claim to enforce an award comes before an 
American court more than three years after the award was made, the court 
must choose between the three-year limitations period in section 207, and the 
indefinite limit in Article V of the Convention.  
How a court should solve this problem, in other words which law it 
should apply to the issue of time limits for seeking enforcement, has 
attracted “surprisingly little debate” among arbitration practitioners and 
 
Enforcement Procedure (Article III and IV) (highlighting the “distinction between the conditions for 
recognition and enforcement of a final award controlled by its Article IV and the procedure for 
[doing so], controlled by the procedural law of the relevant Contracting State [per Article III]”), in 
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, supra 
note 6, at 597, 597. 
28 The New York Convention is not self-executing in the United States. It becomes part of 
American domestic law only if it is expressly incorporated therein through a statute, known as 
“implementing legislation.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 111(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Courts in the United States are bound to give 
effect to international law and to international agreements of the United States, except that a ‘non-
self-executing’ agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary 
implementation.”). 
29 See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (“The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance 
with this chapter.”). 
30 See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012) (“Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the 
Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under 
this chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration.”). 
31 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V (detailing an exhaustive list of grounds for 
refusal of enforcement that does not include a limitations period); see also GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 26.07 (2d ed. 2014) (“An argument can be made 
that the application of national statutes of limitations to Convention awards violates the Convention, 
by imposing a ground for non-recognition that is not permitted by Article V of the Convention. 
Nonetheless, the few national courts to consider this argument have rejected it . . . .”). The reasoning 
of such national court decisions is described and critiqued infra, Section III.B. 
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scholars.32 This Comment proposes that American courts use choice of law 
doctrine to resolve this choice of law problem. 
The existing choice of law rule for federal laws, however, does not 
resolve this problem. International law is considered part of domestic 
federal law,33 and, in a conflict between two federal laws, the subsequently 
enacted rule prevails.34 The typical conflict arises between a treaty and a 
separate, subsequently enacted statute. For example, in Breard v. Greene, a 
federal statute enacted in 1996,35 which provided that a habeas petitioner 
waived her right to contact her consulate if she failed to assert this right in 
state court, prevailed over Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations of 1971,36 which provided that a detainee retains the right to 
contact her consulate.37 The Court’s holding rested on the fact that the 
statute was the subsequently enacted rule, and therefore controlled.38 
The conflict of laws in arbitral enforcement actions before American 
courts differs from the typical conflict of laws situation involving 
international law, in that the conflict in enforcement actions is not between 
a treaty and a separate, subsequently enacted statute. Instead, because the 
New York Convention contains an internal conflict, this conflict carries over 
to national statutes that implement the Convention. Thus, the federal 
conflict discussed in this Comment is embedded within the Federal 
Arbitration Act. Section 207 of the Act provides that 
[w]ithin three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is 
made, any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having 
jurisdiction under this chapter for an order confirming the award as against 
any other party to the arbitration. The court shall confirm the award unless it 
 
32 Ank A. Santens, Difficulties Enforcing New York Convention Awards in the U.S. Against Non-U.S. 
Defendants: Is the Culprit Jurisprudence on Jurisdiction, the Three-Year Time Bar in the Federal Arbitration Act, 
or Both?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Dec. 23, 2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/12/23/ 
difficulties-enforcing-new-york-convention-awards-in-the-us-against-non-us-defendants-is-the-culprit-
jurisprudence-on-jurisdiction-the-three-year-time-bar-in-the-federal-arbitration-act-or-bot/ [http:// 
perma.cc/WLB2-HTD4]. 
33 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law, and 
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction . . . .”); 
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (1984) 
(recognizing that while international law became part of “our law” with U.S. independence in 1776, 
the fact “[t]hat it is part of federal, not state, law has been recognized only recently”). 
34 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (“[A treaty] can be 
deemed . . . only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of 
Congress. In either case the last expression of the sovereign will must control.”). 
35 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
36 Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
37 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998). 
38 Id. 
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finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the 
award specified in the said Convention.39 
The two emphasized portions conflict with each other. The first three 
words of the provision establish a three-year statute of limitations. Yet, the 
second portion expressly incorporates Article V of the Convention, 
including the implied indefinite statute of limitations in the article. 
There are two possible explanations for the origins of this conflict. First, 
Congress may have explicitly intended to pass a statute inconsistent with 
the Convention, and have intended that the explicit three-year limitations 
period in the statute would prevail over the implicit indefinite limit in the 
Convention. If this were the case, then the present analysis would end. 
However, the legislative history behind the Federal Arbitration Act 
suggests that a second explanation is more likely: Congress did not intend to 
violate the Convention, but rather did so unwittingly by misinterpreting it. 
Three parts of the legislative history reinforce this notion. First, “[f]or the 
effective implementation of the Convention,”40 Congress exempted 
enforcement actions from the jurisdictional and venue requirements of 
other civil actions: section 203 of the Federal Arbitration Act was amended 
to explicitly state that federal courts would have jurisdiction over 
enforcement actions “regardless of the amount in controversy;”41 likewise, 
section 204 was amended to allow the district that includes the parties’ 
designated “place of arbitration,” if such place is within the United States, 
to serve as the venue for the enforcement action,42 even though the place of 
arbitration would not fall within any of the venue provisions for other civil 
actions.43 Second, Congress similarly modified already existing grounds for 
refusal in order to comply with the treaty: the Federal Arbitration Act that 
predated the Convention originally did not include “incapacity of the 
parties” as a ground for refusal, while New York Convention Article V(1)(a) 
did.44 Congress decided that “[t]o avoid any possible conflict section 207 
[would] provide that the refusal and deferral clauses of the Convention are 
 
39 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012) (emphases added). 
40 S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 7 (1970).  
41 9 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). 
42 9 U.S.C. § 204 (2012). 
43 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012) (establishing as possible venues for civil actions the place of the 
defendant’s residence, the place where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim 
occurred, or any place where the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction). 
44 Before the United States ratified the New York Convention, its domestic arbitration law, 9 
U.S.C. §§ 1–14, governed enforcement of awards made through both domestic and international 
arbitration. Section 10, which laid out the grounds on which the district court could refuse to 
enforce an award, did not explicitly include “incapacity of the parties.” 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1952). 
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controlling.”45 And third, Congress felt that the Convention did not 
prohibit it from adding a statute of limitations for enforcement actions; it 
interpreted the Convention as being “silent” on the topic.46 This Comment 
rests on the premise that Congress’s interpretation of the New York 
Convention was erroneous, as it overlooks the “only if ” language in Article 
V that makes clear that the list of grounds on which a court would decline to 
enforce an award is exhaustive.  
Congress’s addition of a statute of limitations inconsistent with Article 
V of the Convention was not, therefore, an intentional attempt to violate 
the Convention. Where Congress has intended for its implementing 
legislation to be inconsistent with a treaty, it has been explicit, as seen in the 
implementing legislation for the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works.47 By contrast, Congress attempted to do what 
it thought was permitted by the New York Convention. But in doing so, it 
unwittingly created a conflict with the Convention. 
 Because the conflict is within a single statute, the later-in-time conflict of 
laws rule for federal laws does not solve the conflict in this case. Therefore 
this Comment will analyze the New York Convention and Federal 
Arbitration Act through conflict of law approaches used to decide conflicts 
among states, and among states and the federal government: the traditional 
approach of substance–procedure characterization, and the modern 
approaches of interest analysis, Erie analysis, and reverse-Erie analysis. 
While the traditional approach is the most widely used by courts around the 
world, its use has created foreseeable problems of absurd results, 
unpredictability, and nonuniformity. The latter problem is particularly 
vexing in the context of arbitral awards, since the New York Convention was 
 
45 S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 8 (1970). 
46 Id. (“The [New York] Convention does not contain any specific provision on this point.”). 
47 Article 6 of the Berne Convention provided that an author of a work would retain all 
moral rights to object to distortions of her work, even if the author had already ceded all economic 
rights to the work. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9 
1886, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Congress’s implementing legislation, the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act, contains no protection of moral rights; it explicitly precludes 
parties from relying on the moral rights protections found in the treaty before American courts. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“[The Berne Convention is] not self-executing.”); see also Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 3(b), 102 Stat. 2853, 2853 (“The 
provisions of the Berne Convention, the adherence of the United States thereto, and satisfaction 
of United States obligations thereunder, do not expand or reduce any right of an author . . . to 
object to any distortion . . . [of] the work.”). Indeed, Congress was reluctant to embrace the 
concept of “moral rights,” and as such intended to take a “minimalist approach to compliance” with 
the treaty on this issue. MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 196 (2d ed. 2008); 
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 30 (2010). 
  
2015] The Limitations of Tradition 219 
 
enacted to bring uniformity to the enforcement of awards. The modern 
approaches by contrast would avoid these problems and would be more 
faithful to congressional intent to ensure maximum compliance with the 
Convention, because the modern approaches would limit the scope of the 
three-year limitations period in favor of the indefinite limitations period 
contained in the Convention. 
III. TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
A. Summary of Approach 
The traditional choice of law approach established rigid rules that 
determined which laws governed particular types of issues. The goals of the 
rules-based system were to ensure uniformity and predictability in the type 
of law to be applied.48 It achieved this goal by first characterizing the issue, 
and then localizing the law that would govern the issue. Most pertinently, 
the approach stipulated that the forum court would determine whether the 
issue was one of substance or procedure49 (characterization). If the issue was 
one of procedure, the forum law would apply; if it was one of substance, 
foreign law would apply50 (localization). Essentially, these rules chose the 
jurisdiction whose law would apply, not the particular law that would 
actually apply.51 
However, the traditional approach was criticized on two fronts: (1) its 
rigidity led to absurd results, and (2) the judicial use of “escape devices” 
undermined the predictability and uniformity sought by the approach. 
Turning first to absurd results, the rigidity of the rules resulted in the 
parties’ rights being determined by the laws of a jurisdiction with only a 
“fortuitous” connection to the dispute. In the case of the substance–
procedure rule, the law to be applied was determined by the “fortuitous 
circumstance” of the choice of forum by the plaintiff.52 The traditional 
approach characterized the competing laws without taking into account 
 
48 William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1963) 
(defining predictability as the ability of parties to know in advance what law will govern their 
conduct, and uniformity as the outcome that the same law would be applied regardless of the 
forum of litigation). 
49 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584 (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
50 Id. § 585. 
51 Aaron D. Twerski & Renee G. Mayer, Toward a Pragmatic Solution of Choice of law 
Problems—At the Interface of Substance and Procedure, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 784-85 n.16 (1979) 
(describing the traditional approach as being composed of “jurisdiction-selecting rules”). 
52 Baxter, supra note 48, at 19. 
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their purposes and the context in which they were being applied.53 In the 
case of the substance–procedure rule, a law could be procedural in one 
context but substantive in another; denying this relativity of language with a 
blanket characterization for all contexts has, in the words of one author, “all 
the tenacity of original sin.”54 For example, a statute of limitations may be 
characterized as “procedural” because it is seen to affect the remedy rather 
than the right;55 however, applying the forum’s statute of limitations in a 
specific context could lead to a party being left without a remedy, which is 
the equivalent of not having a right at all.56 Even the rules-based European 
approach noted that “characterization” must be made “according to the 
particular nature of the relationship in question”—therefore, a claim would 
be characterized differently for choice of law purposes than it would be 
characterized in codes.57 Realizing the absurd results stemming from rigid 
methods of characterization, scholars58 and judges59 proposed methods of 
characterization that took into account the purpose and context of the 
competing laws. 
 
53 See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 173-76 
(1933) (arguing that the traditional method wrongly ignored the content of competing rules of 
law); Joseph William Singer, Facing Real Conflicts, 24 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 197, 201 (1991) 
(“Territorial rules are arbitrary because they do not require analysis of . . . policies.”).  
54 Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 
337 (1933). Cook also emphasized that the basis for classification between substance and procedure 
must depend on some purpose, as opposed to “mechanistic jurisprudence.” Id. at 339, 356 (“[N]o 
intelligent conclusion can be reached in any particular case until the fundamental purpose for which 
the classification is being made is taken into consideration.” (emphasis added)).  
55 H. L. McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 78 U. PA. 
L. REV. 933, 934 (1930). 
56 See E. G. L., Comment, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALE L.J. 
492, 496 (1919) (“A right which can be enforced no longer by an action at law is shorn of its most 
valuable attribute.”). 
57 Bernard Audit, A Continental Lawyer Looks at Contemporary American Choice-of-law 
Principles, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 589, 591 (1979); see also Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Realism and 
Revolution in Conflict of Laws, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1919, 1933 (2015) (noting that European systems 
“re-form[ed]” the traditional model in order to “adapt local choice rules to local values and 
changing circumstances,” among them the increasingly technological and interconnected world). 
58 See, e.g., RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 62-63 
(6th ed. 2010) (proposing a characterization method that balances “difficulty to the forum in 
finding and applying the foreign rule against the likelihood that the rule will affect the outcome in 
a manner that will invite forum shopping”). 
59 See Bournias v. Atlantic Mar. Co., 220 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1955) (proposing a specificity 
test, by which a statute of limitations would be characterized as substantive if it were specifically 
aimed at a newly created right, and procedural if it applied generally to all rights). In this case, 
then-Judge Harlan found that the statute of limitations, which applied to the entire Panamanian 
labor code, was not specifically aimed at claims for unpaid wages and was thus procedural. See id. 
at 156-57. 
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The second criticism of the traditional approach was that it enabled 
courts to use escape devices, which undermined the uniformity and 
predictability goals of the traditional approach.60 Critics argued that courts 
would employ results-oriented decisionmaking; in other words, they would 
characterize an issue as “procedural” if they wanted to apply their own law 
to it, but “substantive” if they wanted to apply foreign law. Frequent use of 
such escape devices rendered the term “procedural” devoid of any 
independent meaning: indeed, one casebook suggests that describing an 
issue as “procedural” is merely “shorthand” for noting that forum law will be 
applied to it;61 another treatise calls the substance–procedure classification a 
“gimmick” used to determine which law will apply.62 These criticisms could 
apply with equal force to the application of the traditional approach to the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards. 
B. Application of the Traditional Approach to the New York Convention          
and the Federal Arbitration Act 
The New York Convention most obviously enshrines the traditional 
choice of law approach. The forum (a national court) supplies procedural 
rules, while the Convention supplies the “substantive” conditions for 
enforcement in Articles IV and V.63 Courts have unwaveringly adopted this 
approach: in deciding the question of whether the forum’s statute of 
limitations or the Convention’s indefinite limitations period applies, they 
have characterized statute of limitations as “procedural” and applied the 
forum’s (i.e., their own) statute of limitations.64 In so characterizing 
limitations periods, courts rely on statements by arbitration scholars that 
 
60 See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 
171, 175 (describing the traditional method as “loaded with escape devices,” the use of which 
“introduce[s] a very serious element of uncertainty and unpredictability”); Nicholas deBelleville 
Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and 
International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1106 (1956) (decrying the abuse by courts of escape devices, 
especially the “public policy” escape device). 
61 WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & CHRISTOPER A. WHYTOCK, 
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS § 58 (4th ed. 2013). 
62 PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 3.5 (5th ed. 2010). 
63 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
para. 1669 (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999). 
64 See Ank A. Santens, supra note 32 (“It is often assumed without discussion that limitation 
periods are among the local ‘rules of procedure’ contemplated in Article III of the New York 
Convention.”). 
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time limits could fit within the Article III “rules of procedure”;65 some 
courts have also engaged in treaty interpretation of Article III themselves.66 
However, adherence to the traditional distinction has caused the same 
problems of absurd results and nonuniformity in enforcement actions as the 
traditional approach did in other choice of law contexts.67  
Recall that the term “absurd results” refers to an outcome where the 
parties’ rights are determined by the law of a jurisdiction with only a 
“fortuitous” connection to their dispute. In enforcement actions, the 
“fortuitous” connection is the presence of the award debtor’s assets in the 
enforcing jurisdiction, given that the location of the award debtor’s assets 
almost always determines where the plaintiff seeks enforcement.68 
Moreover, just as the use of a blanket “right–remedy” distinction to 
characterize between substance and procedure inappropriately ignores the 
reality that a right without a remedy ceases to be a right—a reality that has 
been recognized by at least one international trade tribunal69—the 
 
65 ALFRED JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 
240 (1981) (labeling time limits as aspects “incidental to the enforcement” and therefore 
procedural, along with discovery, set-off, and estoppel). 
66 Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Mgmt. Corp., [2010] S.C.R. 649, 661-63 (Can.) (analyzing 
explicitly the issue of whether Article III, as interpreted by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, can encompass statute of limitations). 
67 The leading treatise in arbitration summarizes why simple substance–procedure 
characterization is complicated and inappropriate in the context of the Convention:  
Article III’s reference to “rules of procedure” is not easily interpreted, in the context 
of a global convention, as a reference to statutes of limitations. Consistent with most 
conflict of laws characterizations, time limitations on the right to enforce an award are 
more easily interpreted as “substantive” and not a “rule” of “procedure.”  
 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept the notion that the Convention meant to 
prohibit all national time limitations on the recognition of awards, without 
substituting any international standard [explicitly in the text]. 
BORN, supra note 31, § 26.07. 
68 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 12, § 17.06 (“For the award-holder, the most important factor in 
enforcing an award will usually be the location of identifiable, unencumbered assets of the adverse 
party . . . .”); JULIAN D. M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN MICHAEL KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION para. 26-57 (2003) (“Enforcement proceedings are 
possible more or less everywhere assets are located.”); William W. Park & Alexander A. Yanos, 
Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58 HASTINGS 
L.J. 251, 260 (2006) (“Enforcement would normally be sought by the winning claimant, looking to 
attach the respondent’s assets.”). 
69 In 1989, a GATT dispute settlement panel ruled on whether section 337 of the United 
States Tariff Act was inconsistent with the United States’ obligations under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
L/6439 (Jan. 16, 1989), GATT BISD (36th Supp.), at 345 (1989). Section 337 provided that 
imported goods alleged to infringe United States patents could be challenged before the United 
States International Trade Commission (ITC). See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012). Since domestically 
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distinction in the arbitration context similarly ignores the truism that an 
arbitration award that cannot be enforced in the only jurisdiction containing 
the award debtor’s assets is nothing more than a “piece of paper.”70 In other 
words, the application of a local statute of limitations may deprive the award 
creditor not only of a remedy (enforcement before national courts), but also of a 
right (the contents of the award). 
These absurd results are borne out empirically.71 In over half of the 
enforcement actions that were brought before American courts and were 
dismissed as time-barred, the only connection the parties had with the 
United States was the enforcement litigation. For example, Seetransport 
Wiking Trader Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MbH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft v. 
Navimpex Centrala Navala involved a dispute between German and 
Romanian corporations whose arbitration had been conducted in Paris 
subject to French law,72 while AO Techsnabexport v. Globe Nuclear Services and 
Supply involved a dispute between a Russian entity and a company 
headquartered in Russia (but nominally incorporated in America), whose 
 
produced goods alleged to infringe United States patents could not be challenged before the ITC, 
but only before federal district courts, a question arose as to whether section 337 was inconsistent 
with the United States’ obligations to accord to imported goods “treatment no less favourable than 
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements . . . .” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III(4), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. In finding section 337 inconsistent with Article III(4), the panel dismissed the 
United States’ arguments that the phrase “laws” in the Article referred only to substantive laws: 
In the Panel’s view, enforcement procedures cannot be separated from the substantive 
provisions they serve to enforce. If the procedural provisions of internal law were not 
covered by Article III:4, contracting parties could escape the national treatment 
standard by enforcing substantive law, itself meeting the national treatment standard, 
through procedures less favourable to imported products than to like products of 
national origin. The interpretation suggested by the United States would therefore 
defeat the purpose of Article III . . . .  
Panel Report, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.10, L/6439 (Jan. 16, 1989), 
GATT BISD (36th Supp.), at 345, 383 (1989) (emphasis added). 
70 See ALAN REDFERN ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
¶ 9.84 (5th ed. 2009) (“If an award cannot be enforced, it is worth no more than a bargaining chip.”); 
Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth from Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the 
PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 249 (2001) (“Parties want money, not a piece of paper.”). 
71 For a collection of enforcement case law, see Topic List of Court Decisions on the New York 
Convention, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/court-decisions/list-of-
topics-decisions-per-topic [http://perma.cc/EUD3-TX47] (last visited Sept. 19, 2015). While the 
number of cases is low, this number does not account for the number of award creditors who were 
deterred from bringing actions in American courts because of the statute of limitations. Note also 
that empirical studies reveal that the overwhelming majority of international arbitration awards 
are complied with voluntarily. BORN, supra note31, § 22.01[A] n.18 (citing a 90% compliance rate 
based on a collection of empirical studies by major arbitral institutions). 
72 29 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 1994). 
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arbitration had been conducted in Sweden.73 Similar situations occur in 
other jurisdictions: Northern Sales Co. v. Compania Maritima Villa Nova S.A. 
was a dispute between an American company and a Spanish company 
arbitrated in London but decided by the Canadian statute of limitations 
because Canada was the forum.74 In these cases, the law of a jurisdiction 
with which an award creditor has no connection effectively deprived the 
award creditor of rights secured through international arbitration. 
The traditional choice of law approach has also undermined the 
uniformity and predictability that the New York Convention sought to 
bring to enforcement actions.75 Regarding uniformity, limitations periods 
for enforcement of international arbitral awards vary widely across 
countries, ranging from six months in China,76 to six years in England,77 to 
thirty years in Austria.78 Because national courts characterize limitations 
periods as “procedural” and therefore apply these local limitations periods, 
attempts to enforce the exact same award will lead to different outcomes in 
different countries, contrary to the uniform outcome sought by the 
Convention. As to predictability, an award creditor will have difficultly 
predicting whether the timeliness of its enforcement action will be governed 
by national law or by the provisions of the Convention: fifty-three countries 
treat statutes of limitations as procedural and therefore governed by local 
law, while the remaining state-parties treat it as substantive and therefore 
governed by the Convention.79 Compounding the confusion, even 
 
73 656 F. Supp. 2d 550 (D. Md. 2009). 
74 (1989), 29 F.T.R. 136 (Can. Man. Fed. Ct.), aff ’d, [1992] F.C. 550 (Can. Man. C.A.). 
75 See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text. 
76 Zhōngguó de zhòngcái fă (中华人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration Law of China] 
(promulgated by Order No. 31 of the President of the People's Republic of China, Aug. 31, 1994, 
effective Sept. 1, 1995) 1994 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 134, Article 59. 
77 This limitations period has to be constructed from multiple sources. English arbitration 
legislation defers to the limitations period that applies to all civil actions. Arbitration Act 1996, 
c. 23, § 13 (Eng.). The Limitations Act, in turn, establishes a six-year limitations period for 
breaches of contract claims. Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 5 (Eng.). Finally, case law clarifies that 
an enforcement action is actually a breach of contract claim, in which the award creditor asserts 
that the award debtor breached an implied term in the arbitration agreement to comply with any 
awards resulting from an arbitration pursuant to the agreement. Therefore, the six-year limitations 
period that applies to all breach of contract claims applies to the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
Agromet Motorimport Ltd. v. Maulden Eng’g Co. (Beds) [1985] WLR. 762 (QB) 763 (Eng.). 
78 ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] JUSTIZGESETZSAMMLUNG 
[JGS] No. 946/1816, as amended, § 1478 (Austria). 
79 United Nations Comm’n Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on the Survey Relating to the Legislative 
Implementation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards on Its Forty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/656/Add.1, at 11-24 (2008). 
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jurisdictions that characterize time limits as “substantive” in a conflict of 
laws context have treated them as “procedural” in enforcement actions.80 
This unpredictability is apparent even within the United States. While 
courts have all followed the three-year limitations period in the Federal 
Arbitration Act, they have differed on the distinction between “substantive” 
and “procedural” on another issue that could fit into either category: 
whether an award debtor can raise a counterclaim in an enforcement 
proceeding, or in other words, set-off its debt with a claim it has against the 
creditor.81 Federal procedural law generally allows a party to raise 
counterclaims unrelated to the main claim in the action,82 while the 
Convention does not contain counterclaims (or the presence of debts owed 
by the award creditor to the debtor) in its exclusive list of grounds for 
refusal of enforcement.83 As a result, some courts have followed the federal 
rules and agreed to hear counterclaims by award debtors,84 while others have 
applied the Convention and refused to hear counterclaims.85 
The foregoing survey of case law reveals that state-parties’ adherence to 
the traditional choice of law approach has led to absurd results, as well as a 
lack of uniformity and of predictability in determining which law governs 
certain issues in enforcement actions. Arbitration practitioners and scholars 
foresaw these problems: during the drafting of the Convention, some 
delegates proposed including uniform procedural rules within the 
 
80 Canada is an example of such a jurisdiction. See Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Mgmt. Corp., 
[2010] S.C.R. 649, 663-664 (Can.) (“The only material question is whether or not the competent 
legislature intended to subject recognition and enforcement proceedings to a limitation period. If 
it did, the limitation period in question will be construed as a ‘rule of procedure’ as that term is 
understood under the Convention. How domestic law might choose to characterize such a time 
limit, either in the abstract or in a conflict of laws context, is immaterial.” (emphasis added)).  
81 See Maxi Scherer, The Award and the Courts, Set-off in International Arbitration (explaining 
that a substantive concept of “set-off” would define the rights—the amount of money due—
between the parties, while a procedural concept of set-off would only specify how the award debtor 
could enforce its right to money owed to it by the claimant—by adjudicating it in pending 
proceedings rather than arbitrating or litigating the claim separately), in AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK 
ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 451, 454-55 (Gerold Zeiler et al. eds., 2015)  
82 See FED. R. CIV. P. 13(A)-(B) (permitting a party to state as a counterclaim against an 
opposing party any claim that does not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main 
claim in the action). 
83 See New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V (detailing an exhaustive list of grounds for 
refusal of enforcement that does not include counterclaims). 
84 See, e.g., Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Mgmt., 517 F. Supp. 948, 963 (S.D. Ohio 1981); 
Jugometal v. Samincorp, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 504, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
85 See, e.g., Wartsila Fin. OY v. Duke Capital LLC, 518 F.3d 287, 292-94 (5th Cir. 2008); 
Compagnie Noga D’importation et D’exportation S.A. v. Russian Federation, 361 F.3d 676, 683 
(2d Cir. 2004); Evergreen Sys., Inc. v. Geotech Lizenz AG, 697 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (E.D.N.Y. 
1988); Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft v. Overseas Motors, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. 
Mich. 1976). 
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Convention that would be binding on all states—a solution ultimately rejected 
as impractical.86 Others today call for harmonization in state-parties’ judicial 
interpretation of Article III, even if it means that state-parties disregard 
provisions of their local procedural laws.87 
Accordingly, a more sustainable solution is to move away from the 
traditional choice of law approach altogether, and eschew its rigid focus on 
characterization of issues as “substantive” and “procedural.” Issues will 
always lie in the middle of these amorphous fields and applying modern 
choice of law doctrine would avoid the problem of distinguishing between 
them. The following Part explores how American courts could apply three 
different modern choice of law doctrines—interest analysis, Erie analysis, 
and reverse-Erie analysis—to the choice of law problem contained within 
the Federal Arbitration Act. 
IV. MODERN APPROACHES  
A. Interest Analysis 
1. Summary of Approach 
Developed by Brainerd Currie,88 interest analysis moves away from 
jurisdiction-selecting rules and instead examines the content of the 
competing laws in a choice of law problem.89 It involves two steps.  A court 
 
86 See U.N. Secretary-General, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, ¶ 7, 
U.N. Doc E/2840, at 4 (Mar. 22, 1956) (studying “the possibility of drawing up a uniform law on 
arbitration procedure”); Andreas Börner, Article III (“The most far-reaching proposal to solve this 
potential problem [of different enforcement procedures] was to incorporate basic procedural rules 
into the Convention. . . . The drafters [did not] pursue[] th[is] idea.”), in RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: A GLOBAL COMMENTARY ON THE 
NEW YORK CONVENTION 115, 117 (Herbert Kronke et al. eds., 2010); see also JAN VAN DEN 
BERG, supra note 65, at 235 (“[The proposal for uniform procedural rules] led to a Babel-like 
confusion at the [drafting] Conference.”). 
87 See Emilia Onyema, Formalities of the Enforcement Procedure (Articles III and IV) 
(“[H]armonising effort cannot no longer be regarded as ‘too far reaching’ but a necessity in 
upholding the value of Convention awards in the resolution international commercial disputes.”), 
in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL 
AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 597, 612; cf. Carolyn 
Lamm, Comments on the Proposal to Amend the New York Convention (recalling that uniform internal 
laws in each country and a treaty “incapable of divergent interpretations” were the main goals 
pursued during the negotiations of the treaty), in ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION 
AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS, supra note 6, at 689, 698. 
88 See generally Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-laws Method, 
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958). 
89 Cavers, supra note 53, at 197. 
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must first ascertain the purpose or policy behind each of the competing laws.90 
In constructing the policy, the court may assume that a jurisdiction enacts 
laws primarily to benefit those who are domiciled within the jurisdiction.91 
Second, the court must determine whether applying a given law to the case 
would advance the policy behind the law.92 It must then apply that law 
whose policy can be served without frustrating the policies of any of the 
other competing laws.93 While interest analysis was envisioned to choose 
between the laws of different sovereigns, it can also be applied to individual 
laws within a single jurisdiction.94 Indeed, Currie himself highlighted the 
parallels between the first step in interest analysis and statutory interpretation 
of laws that do not involve multijurisdictional elements.95 
Interest analysis therefore rejects the “unprincipled” characterization of 
an issue as substantive or procedural, which creates the “thorniest choice of 
law problems.”96 In abolishing the substance–procedure characterization,97 
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws maintained that 
These characterizations, while harmless in themselves, have led some courts 
into unthinking adherence to precedents that have classified a given issue as 
“procedural” or “substantive” regardless of what purposes were involved in 
the earlier classifications. . . . To avoid encouraging error of that sort, the 
rules stated in this Chapter do not attempt to classify issues as “procedural” 
or “substantive”. Instead they face directly the question of whether the 
forum’s rule should be applied.98 
Thus, rather than assuming that the forum will automatically apply its 
rule of procedure just because it is a rule of procedure, interest analysis calls 
 
90 See 2 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1111-14 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing the purposive approach to statutory interpretation). 
91 This assumption is known as the “selfish state” assumption. Currie, supra note 88, at 237, 254. 
92 Id. at 233. 
93 Id. at 253. 
94 See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 24, at 283 (“[T]he assumption that choice 
of law problems arise only in multistate cases is erroneous.”). 
95 See Currie, supra note 60, at 178 (“This process is essentially the familiar one of 
construction or interpretation. Just as we determine by that process how a statute applies in time, 
and how it applies to marginal domestic situations, so we may determine how it should be applied 
to cases involving foreign elements in order to effectuate the legislative purpose.”); see also Lea 
Brilmayer, The Other State’s Interests, 24 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 233, 239 (1991) (“[C]hoice of law is a 
means to the end of furthering substantive values. Choice of law concerns the appropriate scope to 
give a legal rule in the multistate context. This decision about scope is not qualitatively different 
from other, domestic, issues of scope.”). 
96 Twerski & Mayer, supra note 51, at 784. 
97 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (AM. LAW INST. 1969). 
98 Id. § 122 cmt. b. 
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for an inquiry into whether any interest of the forum would be advanced by 
applying its procedural rule. Professors Twerski and Mayer explain: 
A true interest analysis approach would examine each procedural rule to 
determine whether a given state has an interest in having the rule applied. 
In making the decision, a court would take into account the impact of such a 
ruling on the operation of its own judicial machinery. . . . The recent trend 
toward true interest analysis which focuses directly on whether a state has 
an interest in having its so-called ‘procedural’ rule applied has much to 
recommend it.99 
Interest analysis immediately and steadily picked up steam among courts 
across the country, displacing the traditional rules.100 Two features of this 
new method are relevant to the present inquiry. First, courts have begun 
using interest analysis, though implicitly, in determining whether American 
law applies to events abroad. In Boumediene v. Bush, for instance, the 
Supreme Court found that the purpose of the Suspension Clause—to 
restrain the legislative and executive branches of government—would be 
served by applying it to the detention of peoples in areas of de facto but not 
de jure American sovereignty.101  
The second notable development is that courts have employed the two-step 
model of interest analysis in order to choose between statutes of limitations. 
First, they have ascertained the purpose behind statutes of limitations, 
generally identifying two rationales: (1) assuring judicial efficiency by 
allocating scarce judicial resources to claims that are based on fresh rather 
than stale evidence, and (2) giving defendants peace of mind.102 Under 
Currie’s selfish-state assumption, statutes of limitations presumably aim to 
 
99 Twerksi & Mayer, supra note 51, at 784 nn.15 & 16 (emphasis added). 
100 See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 44-45 (2009) (depicting through bar graphs states’ chronological 
shift away from lex loci contractus and lex loci delicti rules of the traditional approach).  
101 553 U.S. 723, 765-66 (2008) (“The test for determining the scope of [the Suspension 
Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain.” 
(emphasis added)). 
102 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA 
and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2012) (“A limitations period does have a procedural 
purpose, which is to allocate judicial resources to the litigation of fresh rather than stale claims. 
And were that its only purpose, it might reasonably be classed as procedural and its assertion 
limited to a particular forum. But it is also intended to give defendants peace of mind after a 
prescribed period, and that is clearly a right intended to be conveyed regardless of forum—that is, 
a substantive right.”). 
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give only local defendants such peace of mind.103 A longer statute of 
limitations can, “by negative implication,” also serve the purpose of 
protecting (local) plaintiffs.104 Having ascertained the purposes behind the 
statute of limitations, courts then examine whether its purpose will be 
served by applying it in a particular case. Applying a shorter statute of 
limitations advances its policy of repose only when the defendant is among 
the class of people intended to be given repose—that is, a domicile of the 
state with the short statute of limitations.105 
Courts that have applied this two-step model have declined to apply the 
forum’s statute of limitations in cases where both parties are foreign and the 
acts giving rise to the dispute occurred abroad. In Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 
for instance, a North Carolina plaintiff was injured in North Carolina by an 
exploding tire manufactured by a defendant corporation incorporated in 
New Jersey but with its principal place of business abroad and business 
spread throughout the country.106 The New Jersey Supreme Court declared 
that it had “no substantial interest in the matter” and barred the action by 
applying North Carolina’s statute of limitations.107 Similarly, in Farrier v. 
May Department Stores Co., a Virginia plaintiff slipped and fell in the 
Virginia branch of a corporation that did business in both Virginia and the 
District of Columbia.108 The District of Columbia court applied Virginia’s 
shorter statute of limitations, because doing so would serve the purpose 
behind the statute of protecting Virginia’s defendants from stale claims.109 
By contrast, applying the District of Columbia’s longer limitations period to 
permit the suit to move forward would not further the plaintiff-protective 
purposes behind that statute, because the plaintiff in this case was not from 
the District of Columbia. The same court similarly declined to apply the 
local limitations period in Cornwell v. C.I.T. Corp. of New York, in which a 
Virginia plaintiff sued an airline’s owner and operator, from New York and 
Tennessee, respectively, for a plane crash that occurred in Alaska.110 
Declining to apply the forum’s limitation period, the District of Columbia 
District court found that the forum “ha[d] no relationship to the instant 
 
103 Allen Mass, Note, An Interest-Analysis Approach to the Selection of Statutes of Limitation, 49 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 307 (1974) (“[T]he statutes of limitation in the controlling jurisdictions are 
presumably designed to protect only local defendants.”). 
104 Gary L. Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Conflicts Between Statutes of Limitation, 27 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 11 (1975). 
105 Id. at 10. 
106 305 A.2d 412, 413-14 (N.J. 1973). 
107 Id. at 418. 
108 357 F. Supp. 190, 191 (D.D.C. 1973). 
109 Id. 
110 373 F. Supp. 661, 662 (D.D.C. 1974). 
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dispute aside from the fact that [the defendant owner] has an agent here 
and, therefore, is subject to service of process.”111 The pattern is clear: a 
forum has no interest in applying its statute of limitations to a case 
involving foreign (out-of-state) parties arising out of events that occurred 
abroad (in a different state). 
Courts have thus applied interest analysis to both international events and 
statutes of limitations. The next step, then, is to combine these two trends 
and apply interest analysis to a case that involves both international events 
and statutes of limitations: the enforcement of international arbitral awards. 
2. Application of Interest Analysis to the New York Convention             
and the Federal Arbitration Act 
Engaging in the two-step process of interest analysis calls for limiting 
the scope of the three-year limitations period in the Federal Arbitration 
Act. As a first step, the purpose behind the limitations period must be 
ascertained. As discussed above, the two purposes inherent in any 
limitations period are (1) conserving judicial resources by refusing to 
consider cases based on stale evidence, and (2) giving defendants repose.112 
A key question when applying statutes of limitations is which 
defendants are intended to be given repose, or in other words, whether the 
selfish-state assumption should be made for enforcement actions. This 
assumption would presume that the limitations period is designed to give 
repose primarily to American award debtors. However, there is an argument 
against this assumption: given the international subject matter of the 
statute, perhaps Congress sought restrictive enforcement law in order to 
induce foreign respondents to move their assets into the United States. 
However, such a broad construction of state interests in this argument cuts 
against Currie’s admonition that the purpose behind statutes should be 
construed in a limited manner;113 it would be equally tenuous to propose 
 
111 Id. at 665. Notably, the court was asked to decide between the forum’s statute of 
limitations and the shorter one found in the 1929 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air. It thus faced a similar conflict, between local and treaty 
law, as the conflict analyzed in this Comment. The court ultimately declined to reach the issue of 
whether to apply the treaty’s period, however, instead asking the parties for supplemental briefing. 
Id. The case then settled. 
112  See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
113 See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 
(1963) (“[T]o assert a conflict between the interests of the forum and the foreign state is a serious 
matter; the mere fact that a suggested broad conception of a local interest will create conflict with 
that of a foreign state is a sound reason why the conception should be re-examined, with a view to 
a more moderate and restrained interpretation both of the policy and of the circumstances in 
which it must be applied to effectuate the forum’s legitimate purpose.”). 
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that a state enacted a long statute of limitations in order to better promote 
accountability from foreign corporations in their interactions with the 
state’s citizens.114 The selfish-state assumption is also bolstered by the 
legislative history behind the limitations period in the Federal Arbitration 
Act. The period was actually increased from one to three years, in 
recognition of the fact that  
[i]n many cases enforcement would normally be sought outside the United 
States as a first step. An action would be filed [in the United States] only 
after efforts to obtain enforcement in a foreign country had failed. It was, 
therefore, essential to allow time for these initial enforcement efforts 
outside the United States and the consensus was that 3 years is a reasonable 
period in these circumstances.115 
If anything, the limitations period is meant to protect foreign plaintiffs, 
not foreign defendants. It may therefore be presumed that the statute of 
limitations in the Federal Arbitration Act is designed to give repose 
primarily to American award debtors. 
The purpose behind the New York Convention’s indefinite limitations 
period is comparably simple: it aims to protect award creditors116 by 
allowing for the maximal enforcement of international arbitral awards. 
The purposes behind the competing limitations periods are so 
constructed such that the applicability of each period must be analyzed in a 
given case. This Comment considers the paradigmatic case, involving wholly 
foreign parties who arbitrated outside of the United States. These 
characteristics describe over half of the enforcement actions that were 
dismissed by American courts as time-barred.117 In such cases, applying the 
three-year statute of limitations found in the Federal Arbitration Act would 
serve none of the policies behind that statute, while applying the indefinite 
limitations period of Article V of the Convention would serve the policy 
behind that period. 
First, applying the limitations period found in the Federal Arbitration 
Act would not protect American courts from claims based on stale evidence, 
because enforcement actions do not involve evidence that goes stale. As 
 
114 See Mass, supra note 103, at 314 (warning that “[i]f courts are permitted to ferret out state 
interests beyond the limited purposes underlying the statute of limitations, the result can only be 
the kind of judicial free-for-all which conflicts of law doctrine is designed to avoid”). 
115 S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 8 (1970). 
116 See Milhollin, supra note 104, at 11 (stating that a longer statute of limitations contains an 
implied policy of protecting plaintiffs). 
117 See supra notes 71–74 (providing a survey of case law in which the limitations period was 
dispositive). 
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discussed, Article IV of the Convention limits the evidence that may be 
considered by an enforcing court: the award creditor need supply only an 
authenticated copy of the arbitration agreement and the arbitration award.118 
The reliability of such evidence is unaffected by the passage of time.  
Admittedly, the award debtor may raise one of the seven defenses 
provided for in Article V and present supporting evidence.119 However, 
none of these defenses in enforcement proceedings requires—or even 
permits—the enforcing court to decide afresh the merits of the case: only 
the arbitrators have the final say on the merits of the dispute.120 Rather, the 
Article V defenses concern issues that are distinctly “ancillary,” relating 
mostly to the procedural fairness of the arbitration.121 Consideration of such 
ancillary issues would impose only a minimal burden on the judiciary.122 
 
118 New York Convention, supra note 2, art. IV. 
119 Note, however, that the defendants did not do so in the enforcement actions surveyed 
supra notes 70–73. The only issue in those actions was whether or not the actions were time-barred. 
120 See BORN, supra note 12, at § 17.04[E] (“It is an almost sacrosanct principle of 
international arbitration that courts will not review the substance of arbitrators’ decisions 
contained in foreign awards in recognition proceedings. Virtually nobody suggests that this 
principle does not exist or should be abandoned . . . . The Convention does not contain any 
exception permitting non-enforcement of an award simply because the arbitrators got their 
decision wrong . . . .”). This fundamental difference between enforcement and conventional 
litigation has prompted inquiries into whether other requirements in conventional litigation 
should apply in enforcement litigation. See Maxi Scherer, Effects of Foreign Judgments Relating to 
International Arbitral Awards: Is the ‘Judgment Route’ the Wrong Road?, 4 J. INT’L DISP. 
SETTLEMENT 587, 606-07 (2013) (arguing that because enforcement actions do not involve a 
review of the merits of the dispute, they should not have internationally preclusive effect); see also 
James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, Personal Jurisdiction and the New York Convention, 28 INT’L 
LITIG. Summer 2012, at 3 (suggesting that the need for an American court to have personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant is lessened where the court will not determine the defendant’s rights 
but rather give effect to a prior determination of the defendant’s rights by a competent tribunal); 
John Fellas, Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards: Should Jurisdictional Defenses Apply?, 253 N.Y. L.J. 
Feb. 6, 2015, at 1 (noting that the fairness concerns of the personal jurisdiction requirement are not 
as applicable where the defendant’s liability is already fixed, and where the defendant could have 
avoided enforcement litigation altogether by complying voluntarily with the arbitral award). 
121 Scherer, supra note 120, at 606. See also Sovereign Participations Int’l S.A. v. Chadmore 
Devs. Ltd., 24 Y.B. Com. Arb. 714, 718 (CA Lux. Jan. 28, 1999) (“The control by the 
[enforcement] court essentially concerns the question whether the award has been rendered in 
proceedings which respected due process . . . .”). 
122 Indeed, a primary motivation behind the prohibition on substantive judicial review of 
arbitral awards is to conserve scarce judicial resources. See Peter Bowman Rutledge, On the 
Importance of Institutions: Review of Arbitral Awards for Legal Errors, 19 J. INT’L ARB. 81, 97 (2002) 
(“Requiring a court to decide whether substantial evidence supports the arbitrator’s factual 
findings or whether the arbitrator has committed legal error may require a much more time-
consuming and exhaustive review of the arbitration.”); Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the 
Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147, 150 (1997) (“The extent to 
which a court may review a decision made by an adjudicatory body is a function of a judgment as 
to the extent to which public judicial resources should be made available for this purpose.”); Karen 
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Therefore, applying the Federal Arbitration Act’s three-year limitations period 
would not, or would only minimally, serve the goal of the limitations period of 
conserving American judicial resources for claims based on fresh evidence. 
Second, applying the three-year limit would not serve the policy of 
giving repose to American defendants because the paradigmatic case does 
not involve American defendants. By contrast, applying the indefinite 
period of the Convention would obviously serve the creditor-protective 
policies behind the indefinite period by allowing for maximal enforcement 
of international arbitration awards. 
Therefore, in the paradigmatic enforcement action involving foreign 
parties and a foreign arbitration, interest analysis calls for applying the 
indefinite limitations period of the Convention rather than the three-year 
period of the Federal Arbitration Act. The purposes behind the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s three-year period would not be served by the period’s 
application; at best, its efficiency goals would be served only slightly. By 
contrast, the pro-enforcement purposes behind the Convention’s indefinite 
limitations period would be completely vindicated through application of 
the treaty. 
B. Erie Analysis 
In determining how to resolve the conflict of laws present in 
enforcement actions, American federal courts may additionally look to the 
Erie doctrine. There are many parallels between the Erie doctrine and the 
Convention. Both the Convention and the Erie doctrine respond to conflicts 
of laws by adopting the traditional approach. Moreover, they both seek to 
avoid the same problems created by the application of federal law in both 
conflicts: (1) the use of federal courts for purposes for which they were not 
intended by the statutes that granted them jurisdiction, and (2) forum 
shopping by defendants. Federal courts have developed the Erie doctrine to 
move beyond the traditional substance–procedure characterization. Given 
the parallels between Erie and the Convention, they should therefore do the 
same for the latter. 
 
A. Lorang, Comment, Mitigating Arbitration’s Externalities: A Call for Tailored Judicial Review 59 
UCLA L. REV. 218, 221 (2011) (“Resistance to substantive judicial review arises in part because it 
drains judicial resources and makes arbitration slower and more expensive for the parties 
involved.”). Calls for the elimination of substantive judicial review of arbitral awards in 
jurisdictions that do not fully embrace the Convention similarly rest on considerations of judicial 
efficiency. See Cliff Manjiao Chi, Domestic Arbitration in China: A Comparative Perspective 
(“[S]ubstantive review of domestic awards not only seriously harms the efficiency of arbitration 
but also wastes limited judicial resources, since such review constitutes a de facto ‘appeal’ or ‘retrial’ 
of the case.”), in DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA 45, 79 (Michael J. Moser ed., 2012). 
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Both the Convention and the Erie doctrine responded to conflict of law 
situations by adopting the traditional approach. Under the Erie doctrine, the 
conflict is between state law and federal common law.123 The doctrine 
initially solved this problem by requiring a federal court sitting in diversity 
to apply state law to substantive issues and federal law to procedural 
issues.124 The Convention addresses conflicts between international law and 
federal law using a similarly traditional approach, requiring a federal court 
hearing an enforcement action to apply international (treaty) law to 
substantive issues and national (federal) law to procedural issues.125  
Thus, both the doctrine and the treaty adopted the traditional approach in 
order to limit the application of federal law and the problems the application 
of federal law would cause. Applying federal law would, first, undermine the 
purpose underlying the grant of federal (national court) jurisdiction, thereby 
using federal courts for purposes for which they were not intended to be used. 
Second, it would encourage forum shopping by defendants.  
Applying federal law over state and treaty law would undermine the 
purpose of diversity and enforcement jurisdiction respectively. The grant of 
diversity jurisdiction126 was meant to give litigants access to federal courts, 
not to federal law.127 It was not meant to alter state law as the decisional 
rule. Similarly, the Convention sought to “mobilise[] national courts,”128 not 
national law.129 In countries where the treaty is not self-executing, domestic 
statutes that grant national courts enforcement jurisdiction130 pursuant to 
 
123 Where the federal law is a statute or a rule promulgated pursuant to a statute, it prevails 
over the state law in accordance with the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (holding that state law cannot 
displace a valid and pertinent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure). 
124 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938); see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465. 
125 FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
supra note 63, para. 1671. 
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (granting federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving 
citizens of two different states). 
127 See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945) (“Congress afforded out-of-State 
litigants another tribunal, not another body of law.”); Robert Allen Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test 
as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 813, 819 (1962) 
(“The Erie doctrine can be understood only in light of the reasoning upon which diversity 
jurisdiction is based. Diversity jurisdiction is intended to prevent local bias against an out-of-state 
litigant by insuring control of the trial by a federal judge who enjoys life tenure and is free from 
local pressures.”). But see Baxter, supra note 48, at 36-41 (analyzing legislative history of the 
diversity grant of jurisdiction, and concluding that it was indeed meant to guard against biased 
local law). 
128 Reisman, supra note 16, at 1. 
129 See supra notes 16, 22, 86, 87 and accompanying text. 
130 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (“[The New York Convention] shall be enforced in United 
States courts . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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the treaty were likewise meant to give arbitrating parties access to national 
courts, not to national law. Neither the treaty nor implementing legislation 
sought to supplant treaty law as the rule of decision.131 Thus, applying 
federal law in both contexts results in federal courts being used for purposes 
for which they were not intended. 
Moreover, applying federal law over state and treaty law would 
encourage forum shopping by defendants. In the Erie context, it would 
incentivize defendants to remove cases to federal court in order to avail 
themselves of more favorable federal general common law.132 In the 
enforcement context, it would incentivize defendants to move assets133 to 
the United States in order to avail themselves of favorable federal 
enforcement law.134 Thus, both the Erie doctrine and the Convention sought 
to respond to the same problems by limiting the application of federal 
(national) law through the adoption of a traditional choice of law method.  
The Erie doctrine, however, eventually departed from this traditional 
method. The Supreme Court stopped characterizing competing state and 
federal common laws as “substantive” or “procedural.”135 Instead, it began 
analyzing whether application of the federal rule would frustrate the 
 
131 For a discussion of the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act, see discussion 
supra pp. 217-18. 
132 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938) (noting the “grave 
discrimination” that results when non-citizen defendants remove cases to federal court and thus 
prevent citizens from enjoying state-created rights); Roosevelt, supra note 102, at 6 (“[F]orum 
shopping is law shopping . . . .”); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Brandeis, Erie, and the New Deal 
“Constitutional Revolution,” 26 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 258, 272-73 (2001) (“Since the late nineteenth 
century, corporations operating in interstate commerce had regularly . . . exploited diversity 
removal jurisdiction to impose heavy legal and extra-legal burdens on individuals who sued 
them. . . . Abolishing the general federal common law would eliminate a major incentive for intra-state 
forum shopping and reduce the utility of a variety of popular manipulative tactics.” (footnotes omitted)). 
133 See supra note 68 (recounting that enforcement will be sought primarily where the award 
debtor’s assets are located); see also Martin L. Roth, Note, Recognition by Circumvention: Enforcing 
Foreign Arbitral Awards as Judgments Under the Parallel Entitlements Approach, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
573, 587-88 (2007) (“In the context of foreign arbitral awards, the statute of limitations defines a 
time lapse after which the [award debtor] may feel secure that its assets lie outside the reach of the 
award holder. Such a provision allows [award debtors] subject to arbitral awards to make rational 
decisions about the disposition of their assets.”). 
134 It is worth noting that the Convention seeks to eliminate forum shopping by defendants/ 
award debtors in other contexts, such as the annulment of awards. Article V(1)(e) states that an 
award debtor may seek to annul an award only in “the country in which, or under the law of which, 
that award was made.” New York Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1)(e); cf. BORN, supra note 12, 
§ 16.02[A][2][ii]-[B] (confirming that most courts and arbitration specialists interpret this language as an 
explicit limit on the forum in which annulment may be sought by the award debtor). 
135 Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“And so the question is not whether a 
statute of limitations is deemed a matter of ‘procedure’ in some sense.”). 
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“policies underlying the Erie rule”136—namely, whether application of the 
federal rule would encourage forum shopping by defendants. In doing so, 
the Court developed a uniformity test or “outcome-determination” test: a 
federal common law rule would not be applied if it “significantly affect[ed] 
the result of a litigation” such that it would encourage ex ante forum 
shopping by the defendant.137 In Guaranty Trust, the Court refused to apply 
a federal limitations period pursuant to this test, and instead applied the 
state law limitations period.138 
Courts should do the same in the enforcement context. That is, where 
application of a federal (national) law would significantly affect the result of 
the enforcement action, such as to encourage ex ante forum shopping by 
award debtors, enforcing courts should decline to apply the federal 
(national) law and instead apply the rule in the Convention. Applying this 
test would require applying the Convention’s indefinite limitations period, 
rather than the three-year period in the Federal Arbitration Act. 
At first blush, Erie and the New York Convention admittedly bear little 
resemblance to one another: the former deals with specific American 
constitutional law issues while the latter concerns international ones. 
However, there is nothing in the Erie doctrine that confines its application 
to the narrow realm of federal–state conflicts.139 Indeed, given the fact that 
the doctrine and Convention seek to avoid identical problems attendant to 
the application of federal law in federal courts, it is only logical that the 
New York Convention should evolve just as the Erie doctrine has, from a 
 
136 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). 
137 Guar. Trust, 326 U.S. at 109. 
138 Id. at 110. Professor Roosevelt has suggested that rather than expanding the scope of the 
state law statute of limitations, the Court in Guaranty Trust was actually making federal common 
law that incorporated the state law statute of limitations. Roosevelt, supra note 102, at 15. This is 
analogous to the preclusion context, in which a federal court sitting in diversity applies federal 
common law that incorporates the law of the state in which the rendering court sits. See Semtek 
Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506, 508-09 (2001) (holding that a federal court 
sitting in diversity determines the preclusive effect of a federal court judgment using federal 
common law, but for the purposes of intra-state uniformity, the federal common law should 
incorporate the law of the state in which the rendering court sat); see also Stephen B. Burbank, 
Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1027-28, 1038 
(2002) (“applaud[ing]” the Semtek Court for accepting the “most controversial” but ultimately 
correct solution).  
139 Sedler, for example, argues that the outcome-determination test should apply to 
horizontal conflict of law situations (i.e., those between states). He reasons that when a forum 
decides to refer to an external law and incorporate that law as a model, it has decided that it is a 
forum of convenience and has no interest in the outcome of the litigation. Therefore, it should 
incorporate by reference “as much of the law of the locus as is likely to bear materially on the 
ultimate outcome irrespective of whether the matter is analytically characterized as one of 
substance or procedure.” Sedler, supra note 127, at 821, 824. 
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traditional conflict of law method to a more discerning outcome-determination 
test. This would ensure the uniformity that motivated the very creation of 
the Convention. 
C. Reverse-Erie Analysis 
The preceding two approaches both entail restricting the scope of the 
statute of limitations found in the Federal Arbitration Act so that it does 
not apply to certain enforcement proceedings. Interest analysis achieves this 
restriction by interpreting the statute of limitations according to its 
purpose, while the Erie doctrine achieves this restriction by interpreting the 
limitations period according to the outcome-determination test. Both 
approaches avoid a direct clash between the federal limitations period and 
the one in the Convention because the latter emerges as the only limitations 
period whose scope covers the facts of an enforcement action. In the words of 
Currie, the preceding two methods produce (or reveal) a “false” conflict.140 
This need not be the case. Rather than interpreting away the scope of 
either of the limitations periods, federal courts can merely accept that both 
limitations periods cover the facts of an enforcement action and that they 
conflict. To resolve this true conflict, courts can look for a rule of priority to 
decide among the conflicting limitations periods.141 
The conflict between a federal statute of limitations and one found in a 
treaty is analogous to the little-discussed reverse-Erie problem.142 This 
problem arises when a state court is hearing a federal cause of action and 
confronts a situation in which a state law and the federal law conflict—in 
other words, a conflict between the law of the court of the hierarchically 
lower jurisdiction (state law) and the law of the hierarchically higher 
jurisdiction on which the claim before the court is based (federal law).143 
The parallel in the enforcement context is that national courts are the courts 
of the hierarchically lower jurisdiction; they are hearing a claim—for 
enforcement—arising out of the law of a hierarchically higher jurisdiction—
 
140 See Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the 
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 10 (1958) (describing a false conflict as one where the 
policies of only one law are implicated by a factual situation). 
141 Roosevelt, supra note 102, at 11. 
142 See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (noting that 
the topic is “strangely ignored by most scholars”). 
143 Omar K. Madhany, Comment, Towards a Unified Theory of “Reverse-Erie,” 162 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1261, 1262 (2014). 
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international law as embodied by the New York Convention.144 The table 
below captures the parallels between the two situations: 
 
Table 1: The Reverse-Erie Problem 
 
 Ordinary Context Arbitral Enforcement Context 
Court State Court Federal Court 
Claim Arises out of Federal Law International Law 
Conflicting Law State Law Federal Law 
 
State courts considering reverse-Erie cases have dealt with them in 
myriad ways.145 Intermittent guidance has been provided by the 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, which is the only federal court that 
can consider a reverse-Erie problem on a writ of certiorari from a state court 
of last resort.146 The Supreme Court has heard four such cases. In three out 
of the four cases, it has chosen federal law over the conflicting state law.147 
In doing so, it has looked to the federal statutes and the U.S. Constitution 
 
144 In terms of its place in American domestic law, international law is theoretically on the 
same footing as other statutes. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) 
(holding that treaties are of no higher dignity than acts of Congress). In practice, however, the 
Supreme Court has treated international law similarly to the Constitution in terms of its superior 
relationship to federal statutes. Just as the Court has instructed lower courts to interpret statutes 
in a way that implicates the Constitution only as a last resort, see Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 
297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[I]f a case can be decided on either of two 
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or 
general law, the Court will decide only the latter.”), it has also instructed lower courts to interpret 
statutes inconsistently with international law only as a last resort, see Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“It has also been observed that an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains.”). Therefore, this Comment treats international law analogously to the 
Constitution, as a source of law hierarchically superior to federal statutes.  
145 See Madhany, supra note 143, at 1305 (surveying three trends in state court treatment of 
the problem and relevant cases on the issue). 
146 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2012) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of 
a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of 
certiorari . . . .”). 
147 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988) (prioritizing section 1983 over a Wisconsin 
notice of claim requirement); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 360-
61 (1952) (prioritizing the Federal Employers’ Liability Act over an Ohio law that permitted issues 
of fraud in the procuring of a liability release to be determined by a judge rather than a jury); 
Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1949) (prioritizing the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act over a state court rule that would construe pleadings in favor of the defendant). But 
see Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922-23 (1997) (prioritizing an Idaho rule prohibiting 
interlocutory appeals over section 1983). 
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as rules of priority. The conventional wisdom148 is that the rule of priority 
that the Court employed is the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution.149 
Certainly the Court’s explicit or implicit references to preemption would 
support this view.150 Others, however, argue that the Court was not simply 
applying federal statutes as written, but rather was making federal common 
law to fill gaps in these statutes in order to effectuate federal policies.151 
Under this view, it was this judge-made common law that displaced state 
law as the rule of decision, and the authority for the Court to create such 
displacing federal common law came from the Rules of Decision Act.152 
Regardless of whether the Court (and state court judges applying the 
Court’s holdings on remand) followed the Supremacy Clause or the Rules 
of Decision Act, the bottom line is that it looked to a rule of priority to 
 
148 See Clermont, supra note 142, at 5 (“[A]nalysts most often start from preemption.” 
(emphasis omitted)); cf. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.5, at 214 (4th ed. 
2003) (“[S]tate courts generally need not follow federal procedures when hearing federal law 
claims. However, state courts must do so if Congress specifies the procedure for a particular 
matter.”); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 
1743, 1785-86 (1992) (referencing Felder in discussing the distinction between reverse-Erie cases and 
the rest of the supremacy and conflict preemption cases). 
149 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
150 See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 918 (“[O]ur normal presumption against pre-emption is 
buttressed by the fact that the [state rule is] neutral . . . .”); Felder, 487 U.S. at 138 (“The question 
before us today, therefore, is essentially one of pre-emption: . . . does the [state notice-of-claim] 
requirement . . . ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress?’” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))); Dice, 342 U.S. at 
363 (holding that the right to trial by jury was “too substantial a part of the rights” afforded by the 
federal cause of action to be classified as a “local rule of procedure”); Brown, 338 U.S. at 296 (“[It 
is] our duty . . . to determine whether petitioner has been denied a right of trial granted him by 
Congress. This federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice.” (emphasis added)). 
151 Clermont, supra note 142, at 11 (“The federal court is not determining whether preexisting 
federal law already covers the question . . . . Instead, the court must look at federalism policies 
somehow to decide if federal law should govern. If so, . . . the court then must . . . . extend federal 
law by creating specialized federal common law . . . .”); Madhany, supra note 143, at 1282-83 (noting 
that the Supremacy Clause directs judges to prioritize federal law that already exists, but not to 
create it). 
152 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.” 
(emphasis added)). Madhany argues that the federal statutes that are in conflict with state law in 
reverse-Erie cases “require” courts to create and supply federal common law as rules of decision, in order 
to effectuate vital federal policies contained in the federal statutes. Madhany, supra note 143, at 1282. 
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solve these conflicts between federal and state law.153 And, both the above 
rules of priority were designed to effectuate the policies of the hierarchically 
higher—federal—law.  
In the enforcement context, federal courts—the hierarchically lower 
jurisdiction—should likewise look to a rule of priority that strives to 
effectuate the policies behind the hierarchically higher law—the 
international law embodied in the New York Convention. This rule of 
priority may be found in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which states that treaty law prevails over domestic law.154 Given 
that Congress only unwittingly violated the New York Convention,155 it 
would behoove federal courts to choose a rule of priority156 that would allow 
maximal fulfillment of both international law and congressional intent. 
 
 
 
153 Clermont mounts a realist critique of this view, arguing that the Supreme Court’s 
references to preemption were “wooden” and conclusory, and masked a complicated choice of law 
methodology actually being employed by the Court. As a result, the reverse-Erie problem has 
“morphed from classic preemption into a choice of law that requires an Erie-like judicial 
methodology.” Clermont, supra note 142, at 33. Notably, faced with conflicting statutes of 
limitations, “the state courts come out the same way on reverse-Erie that federal courts do in the 
Erie setting, with each deferring to the other sovereign.” Id. at 30 (footnotes omitted). Such 
parallelism would be appropriate in the enforcement context as well; it would result in application of 
the statute of limitations of the treaty (or of the “international sovereign”). See supra Section IV.B. 
154 See Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”). While the United States is not party to the 
Vienna Convention, it considers many of its provisions to be codifications of binding customary 
international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm [http://perma.cc/R4C5-HA9S] (last visited Sept. 
19, 2015) (“The United States considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties to constitute customary international law on the law of treaties.”); see also Mora v. 
New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The Department of State considers the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties an authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.”). At 
least some members of the Court consider Article 27 to constitute customary international law, as 
evidenced by their citation to the Article in a dissent. See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 
U.S. 331, 390-91 (2006) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting) (“[Breard v. 
Greene’s] statement of a presumption that only a treaty provision with a clear and express 
statement can trump the procedural rules of the forum State, is in tension with more fundamental 
interpretive rules in this area. . . . [S]ee also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened 
for signature May 23, 1969, Art. 27 . . . .”).  
155 See supra Part II. 
156 Kramer has suggested that a rule prioritizing substance over procedure should apply even 
in conflicts between laws from hierarchically equal jurisdictions. See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of 
Law, supra note 24, at 328 (“[W]hen conflicts arise in domestic cases between substantive and 
procedural laws, the usual solution is to favor the substantive rule.”). While this Comment urges 
courts to reject the outdated substance–procedure characterization, such a rule of priority would 
have the same effect as that of the Vienna Convention: it would prioritize the substantive 
provisions of the New York Convention over the procedural rules of the enforcing state-parties. 
  
2015] The Limitations of Tradition 241 
 
Table 2: The Reverse-Erie Problem Solved 
 
 Ordinary Context Arbitral Enforcement Context 
Court State Court Federal Court 
Claim Arises out of Federal Law International Law 
Conflicting Law State Law Federal Law 
Rule of Priority to 
decide conflict 
Supremacy Clause or 
Rules of Decision Act 
Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 
Article 27 
Law that takes priority Federal Law International Law 
*      *      * 
Thus, all three of the modern choice of law approaches analyzed above—
interest analysis, Erie analysis, and reverse-Erie analysis—would result in 
the same practical outcome. They would each apply the indefinite 
limitations period contained in Article V of the New York Convention, 
rather than the three-year limitations period in the Federal Arbitration Act, 
to enforcement actions involving foreign parties and a foreign arbitration. 
As shown above, this outcome contains many benefits. It effects maximum 
fulfillment of the purposes behind each limitations period; it ensures that 
national courts are not used for purposes for which they were not intended; 
it removes the incentives for award debtors to engage in forum shopping by 
removing their assets to countries with restrictive enforcement legislation; 
and finally it effectuates the policies of the hierarchically higher jurisdiction.  
Despite the fact that each approach leads to the same practical outcome, 
two considerations should drive American judges to employ interest analysis 
over the other approaches. First, unlike Erie and reverse-Erie analyses, which 
are uniquely American doctrines, interest analysis—the idea that when 
choosing between laws, a court should apply the law whose policies can be 
served without frustrating the policies of any other potentially applicable 
laws—is generalizable across jurisdictions internationally. Therefore, if 
American courts would like to set an example for their foreign colleagues in 
adopting a choice of law approach that restores uniformity and predictability 
to the enforcement of arbitral awards, interest analysis would be the ideal 
approach. Second, interest analysis is the least controversial domestically. The 
Erie doctrine is subject to constant reinterpretation, and the explicit 
subordination of national to international law entailed by reverse-Erie analysis 
may not be palatable to some litigants before American courts. 
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CONCLUSION 
The New York Convention was enacted to bring international 
uniformity and predictability to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
Its ability to achieve its purpose is threatened by the choice of law problem 
contained within its provisions, and the use by national courts of the 
traditional choice of law method to resolve this problem. Not only has the 
use of the traditional method undermined the uniformity and predictability 
sought by the Convention, but it has also led to absurd results in which an 
award creditor is effectively deprived of her rights by the law of a country 
with which neither she nor the arbitration that produced the rights she is 
trying to enforce has any connection. To fulfill the Convention’s purpose 
and avoid these absurd results, courts should adopt modern choice of law 
approaches to solve the choice of law problem within the New York 
Convention and national implementing legislation, such as the Federal 
Arbitration Act in the United States. For American judges, interest analysis, 
Erie analysis, and reverse-Erie analysis are possible modern approaches. All 
would result in the application of the indefinite limitations period contained 
in Article V of the Convention, rather than the three-year period in the 
Federal Arbitration Act, to enforcement actions between foreign parties 
involving a foreign arbitral award. 
A compelling area for further inquiry would be other issues that lie on 
the border between “substance” and “procedure,” and for which applying 
traditional choice of law approaches is similarly ill-suited. One such issue 
would be the admissibility of counterclaims in an enforcement 
proceeding.157 As international transactions become more multifaceted and 
long-term, parties increasingly develop reciprocal claims against one 
another. Ascertaining a predictable and sensible method by which to choose 
between a national law, which permits them to bring counterclaims, and 
Article V of the Convention, which does not, is the next, necessary step in 
preserving the integrity of what truly may be the most effective piece of 
international commercial legislation ever enacted.158 
 
 
157 See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text. 
158 See Mustill, supra note 7, at 49. 
